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WHAT IS AN "INDIAN TRIBE"?-THE QUESTION
OF TRIBAL EXISTENCE
L. R. Weatherhead*
I. Introduction and Background
One would have thought that the jurisprudential structure of
federal Indian law would have at its base an explicit, comprehensive legal definition of "Indian tribe." It does not. In fact, Congress has never provided a broad definition for application in the
field of Indian law. The question whether a particular group of
Indian people constitutes a tribe for various purposes has been
decided in a fashion that seems at times haphazard.
The problem is one of unquestionable significance for Indians
of all tribes, but particularly for those tribes that are not
"federally recognized." Once any dispute about federal or state
obligations under a statute or treaty is resolved, the next case inevitably involves the standing of the claimant to assert rights
under the statute or treaty. Battle is then joined on the issue of
whether the claimant is an Indian tribe and on the legal issue of
what standards should govern in deciding that factual question.
Thus, in the eastern land claims cases, when the question of the
applicability of the Nonintercourse Act to "nonrecognized"
whether
tribes was settled,' the next case involved a dispute over
2
a plaintiff, a nonrecognized tribe, was a tribe at all.
Similarly, in the case of suits to enjoin interference with treaty
rights, once the duty of the state toward treaty tribes was clar-*
ified, 3 the central issue then became the entitlement of various
nonrecognized tribes to exercise treaty rights.'
A second question, related to the above, has to do with loss of
the attributes that entitle an Indian group to the legal status of a
"tribe." As a result of social dynamics, tribes increasingly, adopt
© 1980 L.R. Weatherhead
Office of the Attorney General, Government of Guam. The opinions expressed
herein are solely those of the author.
1. Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (lst Cir. 1975).
*

2. Mashpee v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct.
138 (1979).
3. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975),-cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976); Compilation of Major PostTrial Substantive Orders, 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash. 1978). The decision and order
of the district court were affirmed with minor modification in Washington v. Washington

Comm' Passenger Fishing Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
4. United States v. Washington, 476 F. Supp. 1101 (W.D. Wash. 1979).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1980

AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 8

the incidents of European culture, their ethnic purity declines
with miscegenation, and the geographic sovereignty of landed
tribes is increasingly riddled by non-Indian homesteads and purchases. Consequently, tribes are more and more likely to be faced
with the assertion that they have lost the distinguishing characteristics that entitle them to their special position in the
American legal and political system. This possibility is hardly a
threat to large, recognized, reservation-based tribes, but it is
already a reality to smaller, landless tribes like the Mashpees of
Massachusetts.The courts and agencies of the federal government are charged
with responsibility for determining the continuing existence of
tribes. They have developed, in case law and regulations, a set of
doctrines and standards to aid them in their task that deserve
close analysis. Attempting such analysis consists of four main activities: (1) a review of the legal underpinnings of the status of Indian tribes in relation to the federal government; (2) analysis and
criticism of the legal standards of tribal existence applied in the
context of Congress' special legislative power over Indians; (3) a
discussion of standards of tribal existence applied to tribes claiming entitlements under treaties; and (4) a discussion of tribal
abandonment, assimilation, and the doctrines relating to the loss
of tribal status.
The fundamental, controlling principle of Indian law is that Indian tribes are sovereign political entities.' Their sovereignty is
sharply limited as a result of conquest or treaty cession, but they
have reserved measures of it. These reservations take the forms of
property rights and sovereign powers; examples are land, 7 water
rights," fishing 9 and hunting'" rights, legislative, judicial, and
police powers over their members," including power to determine
who are members,' 2 and other incidents of "internal" sovereign3
ty.1
5. Mashpee v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct.
138 (1979).
6. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
7. United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
8. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
9. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
10. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
11. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435
U.S. 191 (1978).
12. Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906).
13. E.g., regulatory authority, United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975);
sovereign immunity, Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alas. 1977). Whether tribes
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This principle of sovereignty justifies the federal government's
special relationship to Indian tribes. The powers over Indians
conferred by the United States Constitution on the federal government spring principally from the treaty power' " and the commerce clause.' s As such, the power over Indians reaches only Indian tribes or tribal Indians.' 6 And, as the Supreme Court said in
Morton v. Mancari," Congress can legislate as to tribes and their
members free from objection based upon the equal protection
guarantees of the Constitution because "tribe" is a political, not
a racial, classification: "[T]his [BIA Indian hiring] preference
does not constitute 'racial discrimination.' Indeed, it is not even a
'racial' preference. . . .The preference, as applied, is granted to
Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of
quasi-sovereign tribal entities. . .. "I'
The converse of this constitutional justification is that Congress may not favor a group of individual Indians with special
legislation unless that group is found to constitute an Indian tribe
for purposes of federal Indian law.' 9 That is one of only two
have power to zone lands held in fee by non-Indians is still an open question. See Comment, Jurisdiction to Zone Indian Reservations, 53 WASH. L. REv. 677 (1978).
14. U.S. Const. art. 2, § 2: "The President shall . . . have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties...."
15. U.S. Const. art. 1,§ 8: "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes."
16. Note that the treaty power implies a political relationship, and that the com-

merce power refevs expressly to "tribes." See F.

COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

89 n.3

(1942; rep. 1972) [hereinafter cited as COHEN].
Another writer claims that the historic guardian/ward relationship between the federal
government and the Indian tribes constitutes another source of federal power. Comment,
The Indian Battle for Self-Determination, 58 CAL. L. REv. 445 (1970).
The Supreme Court's most classic statement of the basis of the power is found in
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1885), where it said that the power to deal with
Indians "must exist in that government, because it has never existed anywhere else ..
17. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
18. Id. at 553-54.
19. Cf. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). That case involved a member of the
Papago Tribe, Ruiz, residing off-reservation, who challenged the BIA policy of restricting
certain benefits to on-reservation Indians.
The Court held that Ruiz was within the "on or near reservation" language of the appropriation made by Congress, and did not directly reach the issue of federal power. But
the Court took pains to point out that "The Ruizes . . .live . . . only a few miles from
their reservation,... maintain their close economic and social ties with that reservation,
and . . . are unassimilated." Id. at 237-38.
The parties agreed in their briefs on the issue of federal power. Interior protested
that a literal reading of the Snyder Act [25 U.S.C. § 13, 42 Stat. 208] would provide
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significant limitations on the scope of Congress' otherwise ple-

nary20 power over Indian affairs.

The second limitation is that while Congress enjoys considerable latitude in determining to whom it will apply its powers

over Indians,
it is not meant by this that Congress may bring a community or
body of people within the range of [its] power by arbitrarily
calling them an Indian tribe, but only that in respect of dis-

tinctly Indian communities the questions whether, to what extent, and for what time they shall be recognized and dealt with
as dependent tribes requiring the guardianship and protection
of the United States are to be determined by Congress. ....
2,
While both of these limitations appear to be of constitutional

dimensions, as a practical matter it appears that Congress has
been wont to disregard them. A good example of this is the

Snyder Act,22 which identifies as objects of special benefits "the

Indians through the United States." The Department of the In-

terior originally ruled that the Act authorized the BIA to extend
benefits to "any and all Indians, of whatever' 23degree, whether or
not members of federally recognized tribes."

In fact there is no case in which a congressional judgment or
enactment has been overturned on the basis of the above limitations. The well-entrenched doctrine of judicial respect for individual determinations that groups are tribes 24 makes it unlikely
that any challenge to legislation or to legislative treatment of a
"benefits to fully assimilated Indians, not based on any special relationship with the
government and denied to the citizenry at large." Brief of Petitioner at 18.
In answer, respondent Ruiz "concede[d] that the government has a legitimate interest
in restricting its limited subsistence Funds to the unassimilated Indian .... We have never
argued that the government is required to provide subsistence benefits to the full assimilated
Indian residing in Manhattan. [But] we have argued and continue to assert that the government's apparent belief that all non-reservation Indians are assimilated is illogical... ." Brief
of Respondent at 22-23.
20. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). The Supreme Court has recently
announced another limitation on the exercise (as opposed to the application of congressional power over Indians). In Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73
(1977), reh. denied, 431 U.S. 960 (1977), the Court held that exercises of the power must
be rationally related to purposes of the guardian/ward relationship.
21. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913).
22. 25 U.S.C. § 13, 42 Stat. 208.
23. Opinion of Solicitor of Interior, M-36857 (Feb. 22, 1973), quoted in Wilkinson,
unpub. rev. of COHEN, supra note 16, at 22-23.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1865).
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specific Indian group would succeed, save in the most flagrant
case of abuse of discretion.
Nevertheless, the function of the legal conception "tribe" in
the framework of federal Indian law is still of more than mere
academic importance. Recent federal court decisions manifest
deep concern with the question of whether the Indian litigants
before them have standing to assert rights as tribes. More to the
point, the increasing practical importance of the limitations of
federal power over Indians is indicated by recent regulations promulgated by Interior: "Acknowledgment of tribal existence by
the Department is a prerequisite to the protection, services, and
benefits from the Federal Government a'~ailable to Indian
tribes." 2 5
It is evident that the concept of "tribe" is a crucial component
of the federal-Indian relationship. It follows that the subtantive
elements of that concept are of corresponding importance. Before
undertaking analysis of those elements, it is necessary to discuss
the historical development of the tests for determining tribal existence, and to outline the legal contexts in which those tests are
involved.
There is no apparent obstacle preventing Congress, should it so
desire, from legislating an explicit blanket definition of "Indian
tribe" for application to all its laws relating to Indian affairs.
Congress has not chosen to do so, preferring generally to leave
the interpretation of "tribe" to the executive and to the courts,
and occasionally to adopt specific, narrow definitions for purposes of individual statutes.
There is wisdom in such forebearance, at least as regards adoption of a detailed standard of tribal existence, because no highly
26
specific standard could comprehend all the groups intended.
The reason is that the term "tribe" is used to describe a vast
assortment of socio-political arrangements. 27 If carefully defined
to fit the attributes of one group, the term would constitute the
25. 25 C.F.R. § 54.2 (1980).

26. Mashpee v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 588 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 100
S.Ct. 138 (1979).
27. Because the socio-political situations in which indigenous Americans were found
were varied and numerous, references in this paper to " 'tribe' in the ethnohistorical

sense" refers not to a stock anthropological definition of "tribe" but rather to the
peculiar history of each Indian group. Thus, in speaking of reconciling the legal and
ethnohistorical meanings of "tribe," we are talking about deriving a legal standard flexi-

ble enough to include the different social, political, and cultural arrangements of each
American Indian group.
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grossest sort of ethnohistorical fallacy as to other groups. From
the outset, dealings between European and Indian were complicated by lack of a common cultural ground: for the European,
forms of government had remained fundamentally as classified
by Aristotle three centuries before Christ, and modern concepts
of property and territorial sovereignty had roots deep in the Middle Ages. Among the Indians, the kinds of political and social
organizations ranged from that of the great League of the Iroquois, whose structure is said to have influenced the Framers of
the Constitution of the United States,2" to the extended families
or clans that were the Northwest coastal tribes. The latter existed
without formal political structures, without concepts of territorial
sovereignty, and with rudimentary concepts of property.2 9
The expression "tribe" often has been a tricky one for experts
in Indian affairs. The term "nation" was most used in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and was a more appropriate designation than tribe because it referred more to a
cultural than a political unity. Tribe came to be used generally
after the federal government began exclusively handling Indian
relations. Indians, said anthropologist A. L. Kroeber, were
distinguished as they lived in a "tribal condition" or in a settled "civilized condition." Tribes were treated as sovereignstate tribes, for it made dealings more convenient and practical. "It was we Caucasians," said Kroeber, "who again and
again rolled a number of obscure bands or minute villages into
the larger package 'tribe,' which we then putatively endowed
with sovereign power and territorial ownership which the
native nationality had mostly never even claimed." 30
Thus, Congress' reticence to set a binding standard of tribal existence to be applied to all tribes is laudable, at least to the extent
that more flexibility is possible when "tribe" is defined by the
courts and the agencies.
But Congress has not, in its legislation, left the class of subjects
of the legislation completely open to determination by courts and
agencies. For years, Congress' practice has been to include, in
28. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 305.
29. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 350-82 (W.D. Wash. 1974),
aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
30. U.S. Indian Claims Commn, Final Report, Sept. 30, 1978, at 10, quoting from
A.L. Kroeber, Nature of the Land Holding Group, 2 ETHNOHISTORY 304 (1955). See also
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
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statutes aimed at Indians, limiting definitions of "tribe," each
definition limited in application to the statute in which it appears.
This practice has given rise to the generally accepted belief that
there is not one but many legal definitions of "tribe," perhaps
as many as there are different statutes or legal contexts in which a
definition is involved. Thus, the typical analysis of the definition
of "tribe" is splintered; it discusses the issue of tribal existence as
it relates to each statutory setting. 3 ' That mode of analysis makes
talk of a single standard of tribal existence meaningless, as it is
premised on a view that there is no single standard.
The "splintered" approach will not be followed here for two
reasons, which will be outlined, then treated in depth. The
"splintered" approach errs, first, in that it treats the definition of
"tribe" in the case of each statute as one issue when there are
really two issues: (a) whether the Indian group to which a statute
is to be applied exists as a tribe for purposes of the absolute
limitations on federal power; and (b) whether the group fits
within the special purposes or express limiting definition of each
statute. The first issue is common to all legislation affecting Indians, or rather, to all cases arising under special legislation applying only to Indians. That is, it is true that Congress does not
make explicit statements about tribal existence in all its legislation. In applying the legislation to Indians, however, courts, and
now Interior, are mindful of the limitations on federal power
over Indians. Their concern over federal power is expressed in the
resolution of the threshold question of tribal existence. Thus,
there is a thread running through the case law, supplying federal
Indian jurisprudence with a basic concept of tribal existence not
explicit in congressional exercise of its power over Indians.
Second, the "splintered" approach is a less accurate description of the question of tribal existence in the context of special
legislation than it was ten years ago. Recent developments in congressional legislation and Interior Department regulations tend to
make clearer that a single issue of tribal existence underlies all exercises of federal power. As will be explained in greater detail
below, Congress in its most recent legislation has desisted from
even providing limiting definitions of "tribe" and has thrown the
question of tribal existence to Interior. Interior, in turn, has promulgated new regulations for ascertaining tribal existence, which
reflect earlier case law and administrative practice dealing with
the matter.
31. See, e.g., Wilkinson, unp. rev. of

COHEN,

supra note 16, ch. 1.
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It is necessary to explain the above two points in greater detail.
In the course of doing that, a closer look at the nature and meaning of "federal recognition" is appropriate.
The issue of tribal existence for purposes of applying statutes
was generally resolved in two ways. If a group is "recognized" by
the federal government the courts follow that recognition and
is shown by some trea-3
hold the group to be a tribe. Recognition
34
ty, 32 agreement, 33 executive order, or course of dealings "
establishing a relationship between the tribe and the federal
government. The group that has a reservation held in trust by the
federal government can make the strongest showing. 3 6 In such
cases, the courts essentially accept the judgment of Congress or
Interior that an Indian group is a tribe, as they do in other matters
involving political questions. 31 When Interior makes a judgment
that a tribe is recognized, it basically follows and perpetuates the
historic relationship between the tribe and the federal government.
It is apparent that the question of whether a tribe has been recognized is resolved without reference to the factual, ethnological
characteristics, at the time of the decision, of the Indian group involved. Once recognition is established, it is not necessary to inquire further. It is clear, therefore, that in the case of recognized
tribes the legal label "tribe" when applied to them does not necessarily contain any ethnohistorically valid meaning.
Where there is no recognition, that is, there is no evidence of a
federal-tribal relationship, the approach of the courts and agencies is different. Congress or Interior may act to commence a
trust relationship with an Indian group, subject always to the limitation that the group must constitute a tribe as a matter of ethnohistorical fact. Thus, for example, Congress has recently acted
to extend a trust relationship to the Siletz Tribe of Oregon,
32. See, e.g., Treaty of Medicine Creek, providing for a reservation and other services. 10 Stat. 1132 (1855).
33. See, e.g., An Act Ratifying an Agreement with the Colville Tribe, 27 Stat. 62
(1892).
34. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595-98 (1963). In 1919 Congress
terminated the practice of creating reservations by executive order. 43 U.S.C. § 150.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
36. Courts have used the existence of tribal land held in trust as a touchstone for
determining recognition. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 476 F. Supp. 1101
(W.D. Wash. 1979).
37. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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the Grand
among others. 31 Interior has recently recognized
39
Indians.
Chippewa
and
Ottawa
of
Band
Traverse
After a trust relationship is established between a tribe and the
federal government, legal significance attaches to the existence of
the relationship, and not, as we have seen, to the character of the
Indian group. The group's continuing status as a tribe in a legal
context is not contingent upon its continued existence as a tribe in
an ethnohistorical context.40 This result makes sense, for the
guardian-ward relationship was set up with the very purpose of
altering Indian life-styles, by "establishing and instructing [the
Indians] in agricultural and mechnical pursuits, . . .educating
their children, and in any other respect promoting their civilization and Christianization. . .. "
It is for Congress to decide when changes in their life-styles
warrant removal of Indian tribes from their special status. "2
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held recently that "long
lapsels] in federal recognition" do not "destroy[] the federal
power to deal with" recognized tribes, although historically Interior has taken an opposite view. 3
At times, however, Congress has legislated as to tribes generally without specifically referring to or recognizing any tribes. An
example of this is the Nonintercourse Act, 44 which applied to
"any Indian nation or tribe of Indians."
Cases arising under the Nonintercourse Act presented the courts
with a new problem. It was clearly Congress' intent to recognize
38. 25 U.S.C. §§ 711 et seq.

39. 45 Fed. Reg. 19,321, Mar. 25, 1980. On May 30, 1980, Interior announced its intention to recognize the Jamestown Clallam Tribe. 45 Fed. Reg. 36,525, May 30, 1980.
40. This seems clear from Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F.
Supp. 1297, 1315 (D. Mont. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
41. Treaty with the Blackfeet, 11 Stat. 657 (1855). See also Chippewa Indians v.
United States, 307 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1939): "Whether or not the tribal relations had been
dissolved prior to its adoption, the Act contemplates future dealings with the Indians
upon a tribal basis. It exhibits a purpose gradually to emancipate the Indians and bring
about a status comparable to that of citizens of the United States. But it is plain that, in
the interim, Congress did not intend to surrender its guardianship over the Indians or
treat them otherwise than as tribal Indians."
42. Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286 (1911); United States v. Rickert, 188
U.S. 432 (1903).
43. United States v. John , 437 U.S. 634, 652-53 (1978). But the Solicitor of Interior
has said that "the word 'recognized' as used in the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act involves more than past existence as a tribe and its historical recognition as such. There
must be a currently existing group ...

"

Memo. Sol. I.D., Dec. 13, 1938, quoted in

supra note 16, at 271-72.
44. 25 U.S.C. 177.

COHEN,
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all Indian tribes existing in fact within its jurisdiction, at least for
purposes of the Act, whether or not there existed a previously
established relationship between the tribe and the federal government. 5 When cases arise under the Act involving nonrecognized
tribes, courts find themselves in the position of having to make a
judgment on a matter for which they generally rely upon the
political arms of the government to make: whether the Indian
group is within the scope of federal power; that is, whether it is in
fact an Indian tribe. In resolving those questions, the courts have
fashioned for themselves a factual test of tribal existence (or
definition of tribe).
The cases on this point are few. One of the earliest is United
States v. Candeleria.46 That decision could be read as finding that
the Laguna Pueblo was in fact recognized-the court adverted to
a number of services supplied to the pueblo by the United States.
Justice Van Devanter, however, went on to point out that:
[W]hile there is no express reference in the provision to Pueblo
Indians, we think it must be taken as including them. They are
plainly.., within its words, industrious and disposed to peace,
they are Indians in race, customs, and domestic government,
[and] always have lived in isolated communities. .... 4.
A similar problem of definition was raised concerning the Depredation Act.4" That conferred jurisdiction upon the Court of
Claims over "all claims for property of citizens of the United
States taken or destroyed by Indians belonging to any band, tribe
or nation in amity with the United States."
Where the Indian groups were not recognized the courts had to
provide a factual test of tribal existence. The issue was less one of
federal power-although that figured in 49 -than of statutory construction. The courts had to distinguish between tribes in amity
with the United States that could be charged with responsibility,
and separate independent "bands." 5 0 This required a test that
45. Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975); State v. Dana,
404 A.2d 551 (Me. 1979).
46. 271 U.S. 432 (1925).
47. Id. at 441-42 (emphasis added).
48. 26 Stat. 851 (1891).
49. The issue of federal power was raised by the provision of the Act which gave
judgment creditors a right to levy against tribal funds. Id. § 6.
50. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 268 (1901). The distinction was mandated by fairness: "The main objects of §§ 5 and 6 would seem to impose upon the tribes
the duty of holding their members in check or under control ... On the other hand, if the
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was more refined from an ethnological standpoint. Thus, the Supreme Court in United States v. Montoya5 ' set down the following test: "By a 'tribe' we understand a body of Indians of the
same or a similar race, united in a community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though some,,51
times ill-defined territory ....
For many years there were no further discussions of factual
standards of tribal existence. With respect to the Nonintercourse
Act, this was probably because the political climate discouraged
nonrecognized tribes from pursuing their claims. Recent cases
that have once again brought the issue to the fore, such as Mashpee v. New Seabury Corp.,5 3 will be discussed in greater detail
infra.
The second question involved in determining the applicability
of a statute to a tribe is whether the tribe fits within the purposes
or narrow limitations of the statute. A clear example of this is the
definition of tribe in the Klamath Termination Act, which says
'Tribe' means the Klamath Tribe of Indians." 5
United States v. Joseph" involved a prosecution under an early
version of the Nonintercouse Act. The Court held that because
the Pueblo Indians were civilized and held fee simple title to their
lands, the protections of the Act were not intended to be extended
to them. The Joseph opinion is understood by some 56 to mean
that the Pueblos were found not to be an Indian tribe, and therefore, to be outside the power of Congress. The Supreme Court
did not read Joseph that way. In Candeleria, which found the
Pueblos to be within the scope of congressional power and within
the terms of the Nonintercourse Act, the Court reiterated a point
made in United States v. Sandoval" that Joseph "did not turn
upon the power of Congress over them or their property, but up-

marauders are so numerous and well-organized as to be able to defy the efforts of the
tribe to detain them, in other words, to make them a separate and independent band, car-

rying on hostilities against the United States, it would be obviously unjust to hold the
tribe responsible for their acts."
51. Id.
52. Id. at 266.
53. 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 138 (1979).
54. 25 U.S.C. § 564a(a).
55. 94 U.S. 614 (1876).
56. E.g., Note, Unilateral Termination of Tribal Status, 31 ME. L. REv. 153, 166
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Note].
57. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
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on the interpretation and purpose of a statute not nearly so comprehensive as the legislation now before us. .

..

""

A special case is posed by the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).
That statute is different principally because in it Congress announced prospectively which Indian groups would be recognized as
Indian tribes for purposes of the Act. 9 Thus, the issue of tribal
existence, which under other statutes is left to the courts and the
agencies, was mixed with the limiting definition. The result is a
limited definition of tribal existence. It is not, however, the only
test of tribal existence. Recognition by other actions of the
federal government, and the Montoya-type factual test, remain.
That the IRA is not the sole means of establishing tribal existence is shown by two recent cases involving the Mississippi Choctaws. Comparison of the two cases is an object lesson in the confusion that abounds concerning the question of tribal existence.
United States v. Mississippi Tax Commission"0 was a suit brought

by the United States on behalf of the Mississippi Choctaws
(hereafter Choctaws) to enjoin state taxation of tribal business.
The Choctaws were descendants of those Choctaws who had remained in Mississippi when the rest of the tribe was removed to
Indian Territory (now Oklahoma). Under the terms of the treaty
of Dancing Rabbit Creek, those remaining were to become citizens of the state of Mississippi.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reviewing the jurisdictional question, held that the Choctaws were not a tribe of Indians, and that therefore the district court had been without jurisdiction to hear the action. In reaching its conclusion, the court
relied upon the treaty provision under which tribal members not
removing to Indian Territory were to become citizens of the state.
Apparently under the impression that the IRA was the only
means by which the tribe could be brought within the exclusive
realm of federal power, the court said "the matter boils down to
whether the Mississippi Choctaws became a tribe and live on a
58. 271 U.S. 432, 440 (1925).

59. Under 25 U.S.C. § 479 (section 19 of the IRA), three types of groups are
authorized to organize under the IRA:
"(1) Members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal Jurisdiction;
"(2) Descendants of members of such recognized Indian tribe, who resided on any
reservation on June 1, 1934;
"(3) Persons of one half or more Indian blood." Unpublished revision at 21.
60. 505 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1974), reh. denied, 535 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1975), reh. en
banc denied, 541 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1976).
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The
reservation as the result of the Wheeler-Howard Act. .... ,6,'
court found that the tribe had elected to organize under the IRA
in 1935, at a time when, it said, the lands held by the tribe were
not a reservation. Therefore, said the court, the election to accept
the benefits of the IRA was invalid.
Thus, the court found that the Choctaws were not a tribe, even
though its own recitation of the facts disclosed that Congress had
made substantial appropriations for the tribe in 1918; had established an agency for the tribe at the same time; had purchased a
large area of land for the tribe between 1921 and 1932; and had
declared the land to be trust land in 1939. Further, the facts
showed that Interior had in 1944 declared the trust lands a reservation and formally recognized the Choctaws as a tribe.6 2
In 1978 an almost identical question of jurisdiction reached the
United States Supreme Court, in United States v. John.63 John
was a Mississippi Choctaw accused of murder. He was tried in
federal district court under the Major Crimes Act64 and convicted
of simple assault. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, on its own motion, ruled that the federal courts were without jurisdiction as
the lands held by the Choctaws were not "Indian country."
Thereafter, John was convicted of aggravated assault in the
Mississippi state courts.
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, John argued that federal
jurisdiction was exclusive under the Major Crimes Act. This posed
the same basic jurisdictional question presented in Mississippi
Tax Commission: whether the Choctaws were a tribe.
The Supreme Court found that the trust lands constituted a
reservation at the time of the tribe's election to accept IRA, thus
rejecting the Fifth Circuit's finding that the tribe failed to come
within the terms of the IRA. In so holding, the Court was careful
to point out that it was "assuming for the moment that the only
61. 505 F.2d at 642.
62. A more grievous error of the same kind as in Mississippi Choctaw appeared in a

recent Oregon district court opinion. In Wahkiakum Band of Chinook Indians v.
Bateman, Civ. No. 79-39 (D. Or. 1980), the court held that "Plaintiffs further assert that
they have certain rights as a result of federal recognition of Plaintiff's claimed status.
Neither the Plaintiffs nor their antecedents have received recognition under the Federal
Acknowledgement Act." Id. at 3. There is no "Federal Acknowledgement Act." If the
court was referring to the IRA, it would appear to have fallen into the same trap into
which the Mississippi Choctaw court fell.
63. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
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authority for the [1944] proclamation can be found in the [IRA]."
The Court's opinion makes clear that that assumption is not a
sound one. The Court considered the Choctaws to have been recognized by way of the long history of relations between the
federal government and the tribe, which the Court reviewed in
detail in the opinion:
But, particularly in view of the elaborate history, recounted
above, of relations between the Mississippi Choctaws and the
United States, we do not agree that Congress and the Executive
Branch have less power to deal with the affairs of the Mississip6
pi Choctaws than with the affairs of other Indian groups.
The necessary conclusion is that no matter what statutory context is involved, there is always an issue of tribal existence, as well
as an issue of applicability of the statute in question to any particular tribe. While the former issue is resolved in one of two
ways, either by reference to recognition or by resort to a factual
test of tribal existence, it is the same question. It is therefore rational to speak of a single standard of tribal existence in the context of special legislation, and from that starting point to explore
more fully the elements of the factual test applied in Montoya
and Mashpee to nonrecognized tribes.
A new tack has been taken by Congress and Interior with
respect to the definition of Indian tribe, or the question of tribal
existence. The new approach makes clearer that there is one legal
standard of tribal existence.
Though Congress' previous practice may have been to provide
discrete limiting definitions of tribe in each of its statutes, in its
most recent legislation affecting tribes it has put responsibility for
determining the beneficiaries of the legislation in the hands of Interior. Whereas in the Nonintercourse Act it used the unqualified
"any tribe of Indians," and in the 1963 Vocational Training Act
used the term "adult Indians on or near reservations," 61 in its
most recent legislation Congress has said: " 'Indian tribe' means
any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community . . . which is recognized as eligible for the special pro-

grams and services provided by the
United States to Indians be' 67
cause of their status as Indians.
That definition, or a substantially similar one, appears in the
65. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
66. 25 U.S.C. § 309.
67. Id. §§ 450-450n at b(b).
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Indian Self-Determination Act,6" the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69
the Indian Economic Development Act,7" the Indian Health Care
Act, 7' the Tribal Community Colleges Act, 7 and the Indian
Child Welfare Act."
The effect of the new definition is to eliminate the limiting
definitions of prior legislation. In this fashion, the responsibility
of Interior to develop standards of tribal existence, which has
always existed, is highlighted. Interior, administering the legislation, must determine which tribes are recognized and which nonrecognized tribes ought to be recognized.
Even more startling are changes made by Interior that have
promulgated a new set of regulations regarding recognition.
These new regulations include a meticulous, yet flexible, factual
test of tribal existence. Their purpose is to set up a new procedure
governing tribes' petitions for recognition.
Under former practice, a determination of whether a tribe was
recognized or a decision to recognize a tribe was made in an ad
hoc, case-by-case fashion . 7 As noted earlier, a tribe was considered recognized if Interior determined that there existed a
historic relationship between the tribe and the federal government. In each instance, recognition referred to two things. First,
it referred to operative legal facts indicating actual recognition of
an Indian group as a tribe by the federal government, as in
treaties, statutes, etc. Second, the term describes a legal status: a
recognized tribe is one toward which the federal government
presently acknowledges an obligation. Under its old procedures,
it was Interior's policy to provide protection and services only to
tribes with reservations. 7" In addition, it was apparently Interior's
view that long lapses in governmental supervision over recognized
68. Id. § 450b(b).
69. Id. § 1301(1).
70. Id. § 1452(c).

71. Id. § 1603(d).
72. Id. § 1801(2).

73. Id.§ 1903(8).
74. See note 81, infra. See also St. Clair & Lee, Defense of NonintercourseAct
Claims: the Requirement of Tribal Existence, 31 ME. L. Rv. 91, 111 n.140 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as St. Clair & Lee]: "Leslie Gay, Chief of the Branch of Tribal Relations of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, testified that federal recognition of a group of persons is a political process not necessarily related to any definable standards. It may be

dependent upon nothing more than an historical relationship between the United States
and the tribe."
75. Task Force Ten, Report on Terminated and Nonfederally Recognized Tribes,

Oct. 1976, at 181 (Comm. Print 1976).
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tribes worked to remove previously recognized tribes from the
trust relationship, despite legal doctrine to the contrary.7 6 The
result was that many treaty tribes were edged out of their trust
relationships with the federal government, in some cases because
the federal government had failed to set up reservations or to
discharge other treaty or trust obligations."
In this state of affairs, it is easy to see how confusion might
prevail on the question of whether a given tribe was in fact recognized at any given time. In fact, it appears that Interior is not
quite sure which tribes are recognized. The first proposed draft of
the new regulations on recognition had only the narrow purpose
of determining which tribes were recognized. The tribes were to
present a petition
requesting the Secretary to acknowledge that the Indian group
has the status of a federally recognized Indian tribe. It shall include . . . [a] statement of facts and arguments which the petitioners believe will establish that their group is a federally
recognized Indian tribe which has been and 78should continue to
be dealt with as such by the United States.
Interior drew sharp criticism for its anomalous policies, which
seemed to elevate bureaucratic oversight and lack of zeal at the
expense of tribes, 79 and at least one lawsuit was filed to compel
Interior to recognize (or "re-recognize") a treaty tribe.8 0
Partly in response to this criticism, perhaps, and perhaps partly
because of a new appreciation of the great significance of federal
recognition to Indian tribes, Interior acted to adopt a rational,
consistent policy regarding recognition. 8 The crux of the new
regulations is in the provision earlier quoted, to the effect that
"acknowledgment of tribal existence by the Department is a
76. See text accompanying notes 42 and 43, supra.
77. Task Force Ten, supra note 75, at 181.
78. 42 Fed. Reg. 30,647, 30,648 (1977).
79. See generally Task Force Ten, supra note 75, and AIPRC Final Report, at
461-67.
80. Stillaguamish Tribe v. Kleppe, Civ. No. 75-1718, Filed Oct. 17, 1975 (D.D.C.).
81. Interior gave as its reasons that: "Various Indian groups throughout the United
States have requested that the Secretary of the Interior officially acknowledge them as Indian tribes. Heretofore, the limited number of such requests permitted an acknowledgment of the group's status on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of the Secretary. The
recent increase in the number of such requests before the Department necessitates the
development of procedures to enable the Department to take a uniform approach in their
evaluation." Supplementary Information accompanying Proposed Rule, 43 Fed. Reg.
23,743 (1978).
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prerequisite to the protection, services, and benefits from the
Federal Government available to Indian tribes." ' 82 In that provision, Interior appears to have taken account of the limitations on
federal power and to have overruled its earlier broad interpretation of the Snyder Act.83 The Supplementary Information accompanying the final regulations indicates concern on Interior's part
with the limits of federal power over Indians, and with the issue
of equal protection.
The Department must be assured of the tribal character of the
petitioner before the group is acknowledged. Although petitioners must be American Indians, groups of descendants will
not be acknowledged solely on a racial basis. Maintenance of
tribal relations-a political relationship-is indispensable. 8
The new regulations8 5 effect a striking change in the manner in
which recognition, or "acknowledgment" in the new terminology, of tribes is determined. Instead of an ad hoc judgment
for a specific purpose, as in the past, recognition is now treated
more fully as a conferral of a legal status. One procedure and
decision will be made by Interior, to be relevant to all interactions
between a tribe and the federal government. Thus, Interior has
published a list of "the tribal entities that have a government-togovernment relationship with the United States. The United
States recognizes its trust responsibility to those Indian entities
and, therefore, acknowledges their eligibility for programs ad-

ministered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.'86

For those tribes not listed, the new regulations provide a means
of petitioning for recognition. The regulations set the content of
the petitions; the facts required to be shown reveal a standard of
tribal existence that, like those in Montoya and Mashpee, attempts to reconcile the legal definition of "tribe" with the
ethnohistorical facts of individual tribal history.
There are, then, two situations in which courts or agencies will
be called upon to determine whether a group of Indians not presently recognized is a tribe within the scope of Congress' special
legislative powers. The first possibility arises under Interior's new
"Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group is
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

25 C.F.R. § 54.2 (1980).
See text at note 23, supra.
43 Fed. Reg. 39,361, 39,361-62 (1978).
25 C.F.R. § 54 (1980).
45 Fed. Reg. 27,828 (1980).
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an Indian Tribe." A decision about a petitioning group's status
will be made either by the agency in the course of its proceedings,

or conceivably by a court, in a suit seeking review of a negative
determination by the agency."1

The second possibility arises in the context of a group's efforts.
to take advantage of protections afforded by statutes not tied to

functions of the Interior Department. Suits of this kind have
become familiar in the northeastern United States in recent years,

where the Oneidas," the Passamaquoddies8 9 and the Mashpees9 °
have sued for damages, alleging that their lands were alienated

from them in violation of the Nonintercourse Act. The threshold
question in all three cases was whether plaintiffs were tribes
within the scope of the federal power over Indians, since the Act
applied to "any . . . tribe of Indians."
Although the situations outlined above arise in different legal
settings, the issue of federal power, and therefore the analysis, is

the same. The immediate task is to set rational standards, broad
enough to avoid ethnohistorical fallacy, yet narrow enough to
provide meaningful guidance to decision makers.
There is one more entirely separate legal context in which a
definition of "tribe" is involved: the exercise of treaty rights by

tribes. As will be explained in detail in part III, the definition of
"tribe" involved in determining rights under a treaty does not involve the issue of federal power posed by cases involving legislation singling out Indians. Therefore, an entirely different standard obtains for defining "tribe" in treaty rights cases.
II.

Tribal Existence: Standards Defining "Tribe"
With Respect to Special Legislation

For purposes of comparison, the discussion below draws on
three different sources that have sought to resolve the factual
87. The regulations contain no provision for judicial review, thus the extent to which
agency judgments are reviewable is an open question. Because the issue is one of mixed
fact and law, and because the agency procedure is of an adjudicatory nature to which 5
U.S.C. § 554 would apply (even though no opportunity for oral submissions or a hearing
appear in the regulations [see Patagonia Corp. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve
System, 517 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1975)]) agency decisions should be reviewable, and the
review should be of broad scope, at least to the extent that not the facts but their legal
significance is in dispute. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 30.0 el seq. (1951).
88. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. N.Y. 1977).
89. Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975).
90. Mashpee v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct.
138 (1979).
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question, "what is an Indian tribe?", for purposes of federal
power over Indians.
(1) Recommendations of the American Indian Policy
Review Commission
The American Indian Policy Review Commission (AIPRC) was
charged by Congress to review American Indian policy and to recommend changes. 91 One area in which changes were proposed involved procedures and standards for recognizing tribes. The
AIPRC recommended a new set of standards to control federal
judgments about whether a group of Indians exist as a tribe for
purposes of federal Indian law. 92
(2) Case Law
There is very little case law on the subject of factual standards
for determining tribal existence. The most comprehensive statement from the Supreme Court is found in Montoya: "By a 'tribe'
we understand a body of Indians of the same or similar race, united in a community under one leadership or government and inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory." 93
As was earlier observed, the recent effluorescence of Indian
rights litigation has encouraged nonrecognized tribes to assert
their claims. Thus, the issue has been broached anew by the
courts, but as the issue is still relatively novel, there is very little
recent case law. Unfortunately, in neither Passamoquoddy nor
Mashpee did the appellate courts have occasion to make definitive statements of the law concerning the issue of tribal existence. The only recent judicial discussions of the standards of
tribal existence are the district court opinions in Mashpee9" and
United States v. Washington."5
One writer questions whether courts should be involved at all
in the determination of tribal existence. 96 He suggests that the
question of whether a group of Indian persons is a tribe is a nonjusticiable issue. Stressing the factual nature of the inquiry, requiring nice judgments and distinctions, and citing the proverbial
expertise of the agencies in their respective bailiwicks, the author
91. Pub. L. 93-580, 88 Stat. 1910 (1975).
92. AIPRC, Final Report, submitted to Congress May 17, 1977, vol. I at 461-84
[hereinafter cited as AIPRC, Final Report].
93. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
94. 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978).
95. 476 F. Supp. 1101 (,v.D. Wash. 1979).
96. Note, supra note 56.
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argues that such judgments might properly be considered as exclusively within the province of the political arm of the government. Three considerations militate against acceptance of this argument. First, -a finding that Indian groups are not entitled to the
protection of the government is a denial, or possibly a divestiture,
of valuable statutory benefits. As long as this is a possible result,
the agency decision-making process should not be exempt from
judicial scrutiny. Second, from a doctrinal standpoint, there is a
precedent involving court determination of the fatual issues involved.9 7 One court held that had the political departments
recognized the plaintiff tribe, that decision would have been
respected. In the absence of such a judgment, the court would
draw its own conclusions, according weight but not conclusiveness to the views of the agency. 9 8 Third, the absence of
present recognition is not necessarily the result of a considered
judgment by Interior. It may well have been no judgment at all, a
result of oversight.
More appropriate in these circumstances is the alternative suggested by the same writer, that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply to give Interior the first opportunity to apply its
expertise to the questions presented, subject to judicial review.
(3) Interior'sRegulations Regarding Recognition
The new Interior regulations are paid the most attention in the
following discussion because they will doubtless prove the most
significant to Indian tribes. Because, by terms of the regulations,
all federal benefits are contingent upon recognition, the regulations are likely to be the most frequently applied test of tribal existence. 99
The standards found in all sources are similar in substance.
The points at which they differ highlight a major issue of policy
underlying the question of how to deal with presently nonrecognized tribes.
All tribes have undergone a certain degree of assimilation.' 0 0 It
97. Compare United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876) and United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). See also Mashpee v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (st
Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 138 (1979); United States v. Washington, 476 F. Supp. 1101
(v.D. Wash. 1979), where judge and jury undertook to decide the question of tribal existence.
98. Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (Ist Cir. 1975).
99. As of 1976, there were 133 nonrecognized tribes in the United States, compared
to 289 recognized tribes. AIPRC, Final Report, supra note 92, at 467.
100. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Mont.
1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
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is at least plausible to suppose that nonrecognized, and thus unprotected, tribes may have undergone more extensive assimilation.' 01 The question of what should be done with the people in
that situation is hotly contested. On the one hand, it is observed
that promises were made to the forebears of these groups in many
cases, and argued that the natural consequences of the government's failure to keep its promises should not now justify a claim
that its promise is no longer binding.'0 2 On the other hand, fears
are expressed that recognition of assimilated Indians will result in
the creation of a special classification,10 3 and that newly recognized groups will assert land claims "without warning to innocent
purchasers" that will "totally upset the justifiable expectations"
of those persons.104
This policy issue is revealed in the degree of stringency with
which each source would apply its standards of tribal existence.
Generally, the AIPRC took the most liberal view and United
States v. Washington the least liberal view.
It is here suggested that until Congress should act to make a
clear statement of policy, the courts and Interior should be liberal
in applying their factual tests to nonrecognized Indian groups.
Congress has, in various pieces of recent legislation, manifested a
policy . . . to provide capital on a reimbursible basis, to help
develop and utilize Indian resources . . . to a point where the
Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the utilization and
management of their own resources .. ; 105
to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families by the establishment of minimum standards for the
removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in . . . homes which will reflect the unique values of the Indian culture ... ;,06 [and a]

101. There is evidence, however, that even urban Indians do not lose their cultural

identity. See generally THE AMERICAN INDIAN (S. Levine & N. Lurie, rev. eds. 1968). See
also AIPRC, Final Report, supra note 92, at 434: "The overwhelming majority of In-

dians in this country continue to be tribal members, regardless of where they live and
regardless of whether or not their tribe is recognized by the Federal government. .. ."
102. Task Force Ten, supra note 75, at 181-83; AIPRC, FinalReport, supra note 92,
at 461-84.
103. See AIPRC, Final Report, supra note 92, dissenting views of Commissioner
Lloyd Meeds, at 602-605.
104. St. Clair & Lee, supra note 74, at 97 n.33.
105. 25 U.S.C. § 1451.
106. Id. § 1902.
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commitment to the maintenance of the federal government's
unique and continuing relationship with and responsibility to
the Indian people through the establishment of a meaningful
107
Indian self-determination policy ....
In addition to these broad statements of policy,'" Congress

has demonstrated an intent to reach as many Indians as it can, in
the definition of "tribe"

quoted supra at notes 54-58. Taken

together, these intimations of congressional intent support the inference that Congress would intend that its power be as broadly

construed as possible, and that the term "tribe" be given as
broad a meaning as possible.
The tests of tribal existence developed by each of the three

sources are composed of a number of factual standards. For ease
of analysis, the discussion is organized around the major standards or elements of the tests, which are substantially similar. The

basis test is that the petitioning group must be (i) composed of individuals of common ethnic identity, (ii) forming a separate community, (iii) which has been in existence as such continuously
since before European contact. The group must also have (iv) a
tribal organization with authority over its members. All sources
consider (v) recognition by federal or other government to be
relevant. As both Mashpee and the federal regulations specifically

regard the first four elements as essential showings, they are intermittently styled "requirements."
107. Id. § 450a.
108. See also Ziontz, "Recent Government Attitudes Toward Indian Tribal
Autonomy and Separatism in the United States" (unpublished paper prepared for
Seminar in Comparative Studies in Ethnicity and Nationality, 1980), at 29: "The most recent comprehensive official statement of United States policy toward Indian autonomy
can be found in the United States Status Report on U.S. Compliance with the Helsinki Accords. ['Fulfilling Our Promises: The United States and the Helsinki Final Act, A Status
Report, compiled and edited by the staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe, Washington D. C., November, 1979']. ...
"The report claims that the United States is in compliance with the Accords saying,
the United States is committed to Indian self-determination as 'articulated in the Indian
Self-determination and Evaluation Assistance Act' of 1975. ...
"The report concedes that under American law Congress has broad powers,
presumably including the power to deprive Indians of their governmental existence. But
the Report urges the world community to focus not on the existence of that abstract
power, but rather to the fact that since 1975 many laws have been enacted pertaining to
Indians which, it claims, ' . . . follows a consistent policy line repudiating terminationist
and assimilationist policies of the 1950's, removing barriers to Indian self-determination
and local level control, and enhancing the basic quality of life of native American
peoples.' " [Citations omitted.]
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(i) Ethnic Identity
The first requirement is that the group be composed of
descendants of specific Indian tribes.10 9 There can be little argument over this requirement. It involves a showing that the
asserted tribe existed before Europeans came, and that the present group is descended from that tribe. The AIPRC recommendations soften the requirement slightly by allowing a single tribe to
have fragmented into a plurality of tribes, or a number of tribes
to have amalgamated into a single tribe. The federal regulations
make a similar allowance for this, requiring "descendancy from a
tribe which existed historically or from historical tribes which
combined and functioned as a single autonomous entity." 110 In
fact, the only tribe to have been recognized under the new regulations, as of this writing, was a combination of historically separate bands."' Insofar as it was the practice of the United States,
on various occasions, to split and combine tribes at will," 2 it is
difficult to sustain any objection to recognizing the end products
as tribes.
The district court in United States v. Washington made
repeated references to the blood quantum requirements of the
various plaintiffs' but did not discuss the relevance of its findings. There is no authority for conditioning a finding of tribal existence on a minimum blood quantum among members. Some Indian persons have expressed concern that such blood quantum requirements would result in a de facto antimiscegenation rule,
with serious genetic consequences." 4
(ii)

"Separate Community"

All sources are in agreement that there must be some kind of
identifiable community of Indian persons. This requirement is at
109. The liberal federal policy is reflected also in Interior regulations. See Summary
of Regulations on Tribal Managers Corp., 45 Fed. Reg. 40,672 (1980).
110. 25 C.F.R. § 54.7(e) (1980).
111. Grand Traverse Bank of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians. 45 Fed. Reg. 19,321 (1980).
112. In western Washington, for example, the federally acknowledged Muckleshoot

and Tulalip tribes are amalgamations of smaller tribes combined by Governor Stevens,
and by subsequent co-residence on reservations. They take their names not from any tribe

but from a prairie and a bay, respectively. See United States v. Washington, 476 F. Supp.
1101, 1107-1108 (W.D. Wash. 1979). The Indian Reorganization Act made it possible for

unattached Indians of 1/2 blood or more to organize into tribes without regard to cultural
background. See 25 U.S.C. § 479, 48 Stat. 988.
113. United States v. Washington, 476 F. Supp. 1101 (W.D. Wash. 1979).
114. Personal Interview, author and Pat Oshie, Chippewa Indian and a law student.
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the heart of legal standards of tribal existence with respect both
to exercise of treaty rights and to the federal power over the tribe.
The sources differ sharply on the rigor with which the standard
should be applied. The district court in United States v.
Washington stated that the Indian community must be
"cohesive" and "separate and distinct" from the dominant
culture, in both a geographical and an abstract "consciousness"
sense."'s The federal regulations require that the group inhabit "a
specific area."1 6 Apparently taking into account the fact that
many presently nonrecognized tribes are landless, the regulations
qualify the requirement: " 'community' or 'specific area' means
any people living within such a reasonable proximity as to allow
group interaction and maintenance of tribal relations.""I7 Thus, a
certain amount of scattering will be tolerated, so long as a "distinct community" in a more abstract sense is maintained. The
district court in Mashpee took the most liberal view of the requirement. The court instructed the jury that "[A]n Indian community is something different from a community of Indians.
That is to say, it has some boundary that separates it from the
surrounding society ....""I According to the appellate court's

reading of the trial court's instructions:
The word "boundary" was used during the trial as an anthropological concept. A boundary in this sense is not something tangible like a fence or a border. Rather, it is an attitude
or a consciousness of difference from others, a sense of distinc9
tion between "we" and "they."''
Thus, no geographical exclusivity was required but a community
consciousness among the Indians was. The AIPRC recommendations do not contain a direct community
requirement; however, it
20
is implied in other standards.

115. 476 F. Supp. 1101 (W.D. Wash. 1979). See findings of fact numbered 18, 27, 36,
47, 55.
116. 25 C.F.R. § 54.7(b)(1980).
117. Id. § 54.1(o).
118. Mashpee v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.C.
138 (1979).
119. Id. at 586 n.5.
120. E.g., the requirements that the group have been a tribe in the past, have held collective rights, have exercised power over its members, etc. A1PRC, Final Report, supra
note 92, at 482.
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Continuity

Temporal continuity is also required by all sources and applies
to all other standards in varying degrees. The standard helps
establish that the group is essentially the same as that existing at
"the time of European contact," and is of significance in considering the issue of abandonment, discussed infra.
The standard is not much discussed in any source except the
federal regulations, in which it is thrice qualified. The basic statement of the requirement is that "the petitioner has been identified from historical times until the present on a substantially
continuous basis. ' 12' A further qualification is added by the
definition: " 'continuously' means extending from generation to
generation 22throughout the tribe's history essentially without interruption.'"
These two qualifications make good sense, quite apart from
the underlying policy issue, for the reason that many tribes are
almost certain not to have documentation of their activities in the
years preceding the early 1900s, and may not have it for more recent periods. Fairness dictates that there not be raised a presumption of inactivity in periods for which there are no records.
A third qualification, that "a petitioner shall not fail to satisfy
any criteria because of fluctuations of tribal activity during
various years, ' reflects an apparent policy judgment that
lapses due to conditions beyond the control of the tribe should
not be held against, it.
The Mashpee court expressed a similar point of view: "It is, I
suppose, possible that by reason of circumstances, tribal existence
be so suppressed that it be in limbo for a period, that it not be
manifest for a period . .

.

(iv) Tribal Organization With Political Authority Over
Members

All sources require some form of organization with authority
over its members. As to the organizational form, there is manifest
an effort to avoid ethnohistorical fallacy. Thus, the AIPRC recommendations refer to "such governmental structures which the
Indian group has determined and defined as its own form of gov121. 25 C.F.R. § 54.7(a)(1980)(emphasis added).
122. Id. § 54.1(m)(emphasis added).
123. Id. § 54.7(a).
124. Mashpee v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 586 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 100
S.Ct. 138 (1979).
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ernment."' 2 5 The federal regulations look for a "tribal council,
internal process, or other organizational mechanism which the
tribe has used as its own means of making tribal decisions ...
[The concept] must be understood in the context of the Indian
culture and social organization of that tribe." '2 6
The federal regulations also avoid, at the other extreme, a requirement that the tribe have clung absolutely to tribal forms of
government. A proposed provision, excised before final publication of the regulations, would have required a clear showing that
the "present internal procedure for making decisions which affect
the membership as a whole . . . evolved from that of the
historical tribe . . . and that the present internal procedures are
not an effort to reconstitute a defunct system."' 27 The view that
prevailed is more consistent with the realities of cultural change.
Since the arrival of the Europeans, Indian leadership has had to
take on more complex tasks than those that confronted aboriginal leaders, at least among the simpler tribes. The more liberal
view is consistent, too, with the suggestion elsewhere in the
regulations that the tribes include in their petitions copies of
government documents,' 28 something few tribes would historically have had.
Most tribes nowadays have governing organizations with some
kind of charter, whether or not approved by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. The only real difficulty as to this aspect of the requirement is in documenting the temporal continuity of the governing
organization. The federal regulations provide that while continuity is required, no adverse inferences will be drawn from the fact
that the charter is recent.' 2 9
The requirement that the governing organization have
demonstrable political authority over its members is likely to be a
major stumbling block to nonrecognized tribes. The expectation
that tribes outside the protective embrace of the federal government should retain meaningful political authority over their
members is of questionable practicality. However, the appearance
of the requirement in all of the sources suggests that it is less likely a conservative policy judgment than an effort to remain true to
the doctrine that only quasi-sovereign, political entities may be
reached by federal power.
125.
126.
127.
128.

AIPRC, FinalReport, supra note 92, at 482.
25 C.F.R. § 54.1(i)(1980).
Proposed Regulations, § 54.7(c), 43 Fed. Reg. 23,743, 23,745 (1978).
25 C.F.R. § 54.7(d)(1980).

129. Id. § 54.3(c).
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In United States v. Washington 3 ' the district court found, in
the case of five tribal plaintiffs, that while each had organizations, that each "exercises no attributes of sovereignty over its
members or any territory." This, the most narrow statement of
the political authority standard, requiring territorialsovereignty
as well as authority over members, is surely suspect. The territorial sovereignty of all tribes is limited,' 3 ' the more so where
jurisdiction over reservations has been ceded to the states under
Public Law 280.132 Worse, a rule requiring territorial sovereignty
would exclude all tribes that either have no lands or that have
lands which are not held in trust by the United States.
The AIPRC recommendations refer to the exercise of political
authority over members in the past tense. This suggests either
that the requirement is viewed merely as an element in defining
the group, or that doctrines limiting federal power are considered
satisfied by a showing that, though a tribe has no present political
authority, it did have at one time.' 3 3 The theory might be that
federal power can reach otherwise identifiable Indian groups,
which through no fault of their own, have lost political authority.
The federal regulations require that the petitioner show that it
"has maintained tribal political influence or other authority over
its members as an autonomous entity ..... ",,." "Autonomous"
is said to mean "independent of the control of any other Indian
governing entity.""' This means, by negative implication, that
the tribe need not show independence of the authority of the state
or local governments. The Mashpee court took the same position,
instructing the jury that:
There has to be a leadership or government ....
[T]he notion
of sovereignty . . . is not an element, a necessary element of
tribal existence. What it [sic] is is a leadership which has evolved
in some respect ... which has its roots and has evolved from a
once sovereign Indian community. Now, it may take different
forms.... Clearly, whatever kind of leadership or government
the tribe has, if it is a tribe, it cannot compete with the duly
130. 476 F. Supp. 1101 (v.D. Wash. 1979). See findings of fact numbered 16, 25, 35,
45, 54. The court also found that the required continuity was lacking as to these governmental organizations. See finding of fact number 12, at 1104.
131. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
132. Pub. L. 93-280, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1162 etseq., 68 Stat. 795.
133. AIPRC, Final Report, supra note 92, at 482.
134. 25 C.F.R. § 54.7(c) (1980).
135. Id. § 54.1(i) (emphasis added).
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established government of the Commonwealth .. . [I]t would
not be legally permissible for a group within a town to have its
own courts. 3, 6
These qualifications as to what a tribe need not have notwithstanding, a tribal organization must still show "political influence or other authority over its members" in the words of the
federal regulations. It is not clear how Interior will construe that
requirement. In its decision and findings recognizing the Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawas and Chippewas,' 37 Interior made only
the rather vague statement that the band had had "a series of
leaders who represented the band in its dealings with outside
organizations, and who both responded to and influenced the
band in matters of importance."' 3 8 Grand Traverse is the only
decision thus far under the new regulations.' 3 9 "Influence[] .. .
in matters of importance" is susceptible of broad or narrow
reading.
For the leadership to be such as qualifies a group as a tribe, there
must be followers.... [You must decide] whether it's the [type of]
leadership which would be followed, adopted and obeyed in some
significant degree by at least a majority of the . ..tribe .... 140
Such a showing could be very difficult to make, particularly
among tribes that have undergone greater degrees of geographical
assimilation, as it is simply not human nature to accept more
136. Mashpee v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 582-83 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
100 S.Ct. 138 (1979). According to the First Circuit's exegesis of the trial court's instructions, neither "formal governmental institutions" nor "coercive or binding" leadership
were required to be shown by plaintiff. Id. at 584.
After a long excursus on the powers sovereign tribes may hold, St. Clair (who was
counsel for defendant in Mashpee) asserts that "an alleged tribe [must] demonstrate
possession of significant powers of self government which characterize an Indian 'tribe'
as defined by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester ... Without proof of an independent
and distinct political existence [reference here to all the power listed beforehand], a plaintiff cannot establish the requisite tribal existence for purposes of the Nonintercourse
Act." St. Clair & Lee, supra note 74, at 105-106.
This is simply not correct, at least under Interior's regulations and under the view
adopted by the district court in Mashpee. As to the latter, St. Clair & Lee suggest that
"there may have been error which benefited [sic] the plaintiff." Id. at 107. [James St.
Clair was former President Nixon's attorney in the tapes case. His old adversary, Archibald
Cox, was counsel for the tribe in Passamaquoddy.)
137. 45 Fed. Reg. 19,321 (1980).
138. Id.
139. Interior has published a notice of intent to recognize the Jamestown Clallam
Tribe, but has not published its findings. 45 Fed. Reg. 36,525 (1980).
140. Mashpee v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 583 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 100
S.Ct. 138 (1979).
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authority than one absolutely must. There is also difficulty in
store for those tribes that preserved social order by strong
adherence to tradition, enforced by ostracism and peer pressure,
rather than by political systems and coercion, because the former
kind of "political authority," even if it continues to the present
day, is markedly less visible and therefore less susceptible of
documentation.
(v) Recognition by Federal, State, and Local Governments, and
by Other Indian Tribes
These cannot be called requirements but are rather significant
evidentiary factors. Clearly, recognition by the federal government, or interaction with it sufficient to establish that it undertook a trust responsibility toward the tribe, are important legal
facts. Recognition by state and local governments, and by Indian
tribes,' 4 ' can provide documentation of the tribe's historical and
present existence.
While policy considerations are implicit in the application of all
the foregoing standards, they are most obvious in the decision of
what mix of factors must be shown and upon whom the burden
of showing them will be put. The AIPRC recommended that all
claimants be recognized, unless the United States could show that
none of the standards were met. It further recommended that in
the event of an agency determination adverse to the claimant, the
United States should again bear the burden of proof before a
three-judge district court.' 4 2 The federal regulations put the
burden of production and proof on the petitioner by requiring
that the petition have a specified content;' 3 however, they provide that the agency will provide limited assistance in preparing
petitions' and may do research of its own at the agency review
stage.' 4 5 It is not clear from the regulations on what grounds a
petition will be denied or granted, but ethnic identity, 4 6 continuity,' 47 community, 4 ' organization,' 4 9 and political authority' 50 are
141. See COHEN, supra note 16, at 271. See also Tully v. United States, 32 Ct. CI. 1
(1896).
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

AIPRC, Final Report, supra note 92, at 481-83.
25 C.F.R. § 54.7(a) (1980).
25 C.F.R. § 54.6(d) (1980).
25 C.F.R. § 54.9(a) (1980).
25 C.F.R. § 54.7(e), (f), (g), (1980).
25 C.F.R. § 54.7(a), (c) (1980).
25 C.F.R. § 54.7(b) (1980).
25 C.F.R. § 54.7(d) (1980).
25 C.F.R. § 54.7(c) (1980).
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listed as "mandatory criteria,"'"' whereas federal, state, local,
and Indian recognition are interchangeable types of evidence.' 2
Mashpee and United States v. Washington both put the burden
of proof on the tribes.'5 3 The Mashpee court regarded the four elements of the Montoya test ("(a) 'same or similar race'; (b) 'united in a community'; (c) 'under one leadership or government';
and (d) 'inhabiting a particular . . . territory' ") as the sine qua
non of proof of tribal existence.' 4 The United States v.
Washington court, by contrast, listed all the above elements of
the standard as "relevant factors to be considered" without
specifying which, if any, were entitled to greater weight.
The various elements of the above test of tribal existence comport well with the controlling doctrines of federal Indian law.
They reflect a considered effort to refine the legal definition of
"tribe" to better approximate the peculiar ethnohistorical facts
concerning individual tribes. Finally, such elements are just, if
applied with sufficient elasticity to prevent foreclosure of the
rights of those tribes which do not fit into preconceived
stereotypes.
III.

Tribal Existence: Definition of "Tribe"
for Purposes of Exercise of Treaty Rights

The second legal context that requires a definition of "tribe"
involves treaty rights; there the question is who may hold and exercise them. It is well settled that treaty hunting, fishing, and
water rights are the communal property of tribes, whose members
may exercise them.
The discussion that follows seeks an explanation of what is
meant by the term "tribe" as used in the context of treaty rights.
As will become clearer below, the definition is entirely different
in the case of treaty rights from that in the context of special
legislation in favor of Indians. Essentially, the difference is attributable to the fact that the issue of federal power is not
presented in treaty rights cases as it is in the cases involving
legislative power over Indians. Some definition of "tribe" is re151. 25 C.F.R. § 54.7 (1980).
152. 25 C.F.R. § 54.7(a) (1980).
153. Mashpee v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 582 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 138 (1979). The district court did not specifically refer to a burden of proof in United
States v. Washington, but see Brief of Samish et al. Tribes in their appeal, Civ. § 79-4447,
filed June 6, 1979.
154. 592 F.2d at 582.
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quired, however, in order to describe the community entitled to
exercise treaty rights.
The Department of Interior has regulations governing exercise
of off-reservation treaty fishing rights by Indians.' 55 They will not
be further discussed here, as they make no binding law on the
rights of any Indians. The regulations leave that to the courts by
their savings provisions:
Nothing in this Part 256 shall be deemed to:
(b) Deprive any Indian tribe, band, or group of any right
which may be secured it by any treaty or other law of the
United States ...
(d) Enlarge the right, privilege, or immunity of any person to
that granted or reserved
engage in any fishing activity beyond
56
by treaty with the United States.'
The following discussion, like that in part II, focuses on the
predicament of currently nonrecognized tribes. As to these, it
should be borne in mind that treaty signatories ihat are currently
not recognized constitute a special class of tribes, halfway between presently recognized tribes and tribes such as the
Mashpees, which have never- been recognized. They were
recognized at the time they were made parties to the treaties on
which they base their claims, but they have since dropped from
Interior's purview. It bears remarking that Interior has not heeded the strictures of federal doctrine to the effect that only Congress can terminate the trust relationship once it is begun. If Interior had performed consistently with the doctrine, the question
of entitlements of nonrecognized tribes under treaties would
never have been posed.
As we have seen, however, Interior's practice has been to lose
sight of once-recognized tribes, and this practice has been implicitly accepted by at least one court.' 57 Unfortunate as that may
be for Indian tribes, it does not affect the fishing and hunting
rights secured them in the treaties. Those property rights are contingent only upon meeting the test of tribal existence discussed
below.
What is certain, at the outset, is that in determining whether a
155. 25 C.F.R. §
156. 25 C.F.R. §
157. The district
Wash. 1979), did not
recognized tribe.

256 (1980).
256.7 (1980).
court in United States v. Washington, 476 F. Supp. 1101 (V.D.
discuss or explain the plaintiff's transition from treaty tribe to non-
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tribe is entitled to exercise treaty rights, present federal recognition is not a decisive factor. It is relevant to the extent that tribes
presently recognized by the federal government have fewer
theoretical barriers to overcome in vindicating their rights
(though substantial practical barriers may remain' 5 8). That is, in
the case of a presently recognized tribe, the tribe's opponents
would not get far with a claim that the tribe was not a tribe for
any purposes, including the exercise of treaty rights.
The converse is not true, however, in the case of tribes not
presently recognized, the absence of such recognition does not
mean that the tribe cannot exercise rights guaranteed it by treaty.
In Menominee Tribe v. United States,"9 the terminated Me-

nominee Tribe sought compensation for the value of treaty hunting and fishing rights which they assumed1 60 they had lost as a
result of termination. The Supreme Court held that termination
did not extinguish the treaty rights, saying: "We find it difficult
to believe that Congress, without explicit statement, would sub-

ject the United States to a claim for compensation by destroying

property rights conferred by treaty."' 6' The result was followed
in Kimball v. Callahan,'62 a suit by members of the terminated
Klamath Tribe to enjoin the state of Oregon from interference
with its treaty hunting and fishing rights. In Kimball 11,163 a
related case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that
while the Termination Act "terminated federal supervision over
trust and restricted property of the Klamath Indians, disposed of
federally owned property, and terminated federal services to the
158. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), concurring
opinion of Judge Burns at 693: "The record in this case, and this history set forth in the
Puyallup and Antoine cases, among others, make it crystal clear that it has been
recalcitrance of Washington State officials (and their vocal non-Indian commercial and
sports-fishing allies) which produced the denial of Indian rights requiring intervention by
the district court. This responsibility should neither escape notice nor be forgotten,"
Later, the Ninth Circuit had further occasion to comment upon "the state's extraordinary
machinations in resisting the [district court's] decree. . . . Except for some desegregation
cases . . . , the district court has faced the most concerted official and private efforts to
frustrate a decree of a federal court witnessed in this century." Puget Sound Gillnetters
Ass'n v. United States District Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978).
159. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
160. In fact, three Menominees were prosecuted for violation of Wisconsin hunting
and fishing regulations. The convictions were upheld by the state supreme court on the
theory that the treaty had been abrogated by the Termination Act.
161. 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968).
162. 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974) (Kimball 1).
163. 590 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kimball H).
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Indians, it specifically contemplated the continuing existence of
the Klamath Tribe." 6' Termination, then, amounted to a congressional declaration that it would no longer acknowledge the
Klamath and Menominee tribes; in a word, it amounted to "derecognition." Inasmuch as the Menominees and Klamaths kept
their treaty hunting and fishing rights, lack of acknowledgment
was not a bar to exercise of such rights.
In a case involving two tribes which, while they had not been
terminated, were nevertheless not presently recognized, the Ninth
Circuit again held in United States v. Washington'6' that absence
of acknowledgment had no effect on treaty rights. Affirming the
district court's determination that the Stillaguamish and Upper
Skagit tribes were "each a holder of the right of taking fish
secured to Indians by the Treaty of Point Elliot,' 6 the court
said: "Non-recognition of the tribe by the federal government
and the failure of the Secretary of the Interior to approve a
tribe's enrollment . . . can have no effect upon vested treaty
rights."' 67 The results in Kimball, Menominee, and United States
v. Washington are consistent with the doctrine that, while Indian
treaties may be abrogated,'6 s only Congress has the power to do
so,'" 6 9 and then only by express provision:' 7 0 intent to abrogate
treaties will not be imputed to ambiguous congressional action. ' 7'
The result is especially appropriate in the case of the Stillaguamish and Upper Skagit, where no congressional action was involved at all. For the court to have held otherwise would have
opened the door to the anomalous possibility that although only
Congress has the power to abrogate treaties and divest' valuable
property rights, 173 Interior could accomplish the same result by
refusing (or failing) to extend present recognition to treaty tribes;
164. Id. at 775-76.
165. 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
166. 384 F. Supp. 312, 401 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
167. 520 F.2d at 693
168. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
169. Id.
170. United States v. Winnebago Tribe, 542 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1976). But see Seneca
Nation v. United States, 338 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 952 (1965),
and Seneca Nation v. Brucker, 262 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
171. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968).
172. It seems safe to assume that treaty rights "vest" as of ratification of the treaty.
173. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) and Washington v.
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 681-82 (1979).
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that while the executive may not nullify
treaties, it may nullify
7

tribes, with the same consequences.

4

If present federal acknowledgment is not the measure of

whether a tribe is a tribe for purposes of exercising treaty rights,
the question remains, what is? The Kimball and Menominee
courts left this question open.' 7 1 In United States v. Washington,
however, the Ninth Circuit set the following standard: "Whether

a group of citizens of Indian ancestry is descended from a treaty
signatory and has maintained an organized tribal structure.... 76
,
There can be little debate about what is intended by the first
element of the standard. It encompasses the source of the
asserted rights ("treaty signatory") and requires a demonstration

of an anthropological nexus between the present claimant and the
tribe that was the original grantee. The second element clearly in-

volves in part a requirement of some kind of continuity ("maintained"). The part referring to that which must have been maintained ("organized tribal structure") is susceptible of at least two
interpretations.
One possibility is that by "organized tribal structure" the court
meant that a tribe must have a comprehensive tribal government
and be in possession of a full set of sovereign powers, at least to
the extent possessed by other, presently recognized Indian tribes.
The argument might be that absent such sovereign powers and accoutrements, the tribe would be beyond federal power, merely "a
174. It is true that a theoretical distinction may be drawn between declaring that a
right no longer exists and that the person or entity that held the right no longer exists.
However, in substance, the result is the same. There is no apparent reason why the
"superior justice which looks only to the substance of the right, without regard to
technical rules" (United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905), which is part of
the special relationship of the federal government to Indian tribes, should succumb in this
instance to nice legalisms.
175. In the Kimball cases, the court did not address the issue directly, although the
Kimball 11 opinion contains some interesting language suggesting that the standard to be
applied would not be too strict. The court held (590 F.2d at 773) that Kimball, who had
withdraxvn from the tribe, taking his share of tribal assets pursuant to the provisions of
the Termination Act, "withdrew from the tribe [solely] for purposes of the Termination
Act [which] did not change his relationship with the Tribe as to matters unaffected by the
Act, e.g., treaty hunting, fishing and trapping rights." Significantly, the court went on to
note that "Congress recognized that local officials would have difficulty in later years
identifying those who had hunting and fishing rights." Id. at 773.
The Menominee court declined to express an opinion on the question of which of two
tribal corporations would hold the treaty rights. "We believe it inappropriate, however,
to resolve the question of who the beneficiaries of the hunting and fishing rights may be;
and we expressly reserve decision on it." 391 U.S. at 409 n.10.
176. 520 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1975).
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discrete
racial group" rather than a "quasi-sovereign tribal entity,"1 77 and exercise of treaty rights under those circumstances
would be impermissible as in violation of the equal protection
guarantees of the fourteenth and fifth amendments.1 7 1 In other
words, without the characteristics of a sovereign tribe, the claimant would fall outside the exception to equal protection law enunciated in Morton v. Mancari.'"
This interpretation fails for two reasons. First, as a practical
matter, a tribe that could prove it had all the incidents of tribal
sovereignty would almost certainly be recognized by the government; without recognition, a tribe is not likely to retain many
powers. ' If it had sufficient proof of tribal existence it would be
in as good a position in a lawsuit over treaty rights as if it were
recognized by Interior. In either situation, the statement that
recognition is not a necessary precondition to the exercise of treaty rights would be completely meaningless.
Second, and more significant, the interpretation fails because it
assumes implicitly that treaty rights are "special rights" the exercise of which is unconstitutional unless justified on Mancari
grounds. Analytically, the error lies in failing to draw the essential distinction between preferential treatment at the hands of the
legislature, and the unique rights that ownership of property confers on owners. Mancari involved legislation granting a hiring
preference to Indians within the Bureau of Indian Affairs. As the
Supreme Court explained in Washington v. Confederated Bands
& Tribes of the Yakima Nation, 8 ' "It is settled that 'the unique
legal status of Indian tribes under federal law' permits the Federal
Government to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians,
legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive.
Morton v. Mancari.... " 8 2
177. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974).
178. Equal protection analysis is the same under either amendment. Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
179. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
180. While the sovereignty of Indian tribes does not spring from the federal government, and therefore is not dependent in any theoretical sense upon the latter's
acknowledgment (see, e.g., Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy, 599 F.2d 1061 (Ist Cir. 1979),
without the cognizance and protection of the federal government tribal sovereignty can,
realistically, exist only in theory. Modern Indian law has recognized that sovereignty and
federal preemption occupy a kind of grey area. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), and Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation v.
Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978) (3-judge district court).
181. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
182. Id. at 500-501 (emphasis added).
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The enactment of affirmative "legislation singling out tribal

Indians" is a different thing entirely from protecting the rights of
any property owner. Treaty rights are property of tribes, "spe-

cial" only in that they confer rights on their owners not shared by
nonowners, a common characteristic of property. They do not
constitute some kind of self-renewing exercise of federal power in
favor of the treaty tribes. The question of federal power may

have been present at the time the treaty was ratified and the
reserved rights of the Indians confirmed. The existence of the

treaty, however, confirms that the Indians were within Congress'
power at that time. Thereafter, the rights vested in the tribes as
property. The only federal power thereafter exercised with respect
to the treaties is that necessary to protect the property rights conveyed by treaty. The power of the government to secure and protect property rights is not, however, limited to Indian tribes.
Disputes over treaty rights are property disputes-there is no dif-

ference in principle between affirmation of treaty rights in a court

proceeding and an ordinary quiet title action over real estate." 3 It
is evident that the court in United States v. Washington grasped
this distinction between property and special legislative treatment,

for it said: "Non-recognition of the tribe by the federal government and the failure of the Secretary of the Interior to approve a
183. Clearly the crux of this analysis is that treaty rights are property. They have been
explicitly so characterized in Menominee (391 U.S. 413). That characterization was a
necessary ratio decidendi of the opinion: the Court viewed the alternatives as compensation for taking, or no treaty abrogation. Similarly, the Kimball I court was aided in its
decision by the observation that Congress had considered payment for treaty rights but
had elected not to pay: again, the fundamental proposition is that treaty hunting and
fishing rights are property, for which compensation must be paid if they are taken. Id. at
568-69 n.9.
Congress has in the past condemned treaty fishing rights and paid compensation
therefor. When it authorized construction of the Dalles Dam, which was to inundate
Celilo Falls, a traditional Indian fishing place on the Columbia, Congress included appropriations to pay for the condemned rights. See Pub. L. 153, July 27, 1953, 67 Stat.
198. Payments made under that authorization totaled $26,888,395.32, "which was based
upon a capitalization at 3 percent of the total value of the fish caught by the Indians in an
average year . . ." Whitefoot v. United States, Ill Ct. Cl. 127, 150-51 (1961).
The Kimball I court in its jurisdictional statement put the value of the treaty right at
"the value to each plaintiff of the game and fish he would take if completely free of
regulation, less the value of the limited amounts of game and fish he could take if
regulated by statute." Kimball I, 493 F.2d at 565. See also Kimball II, 590 F.2d at 773
(treaty rights communal rights in which individual members have a right of user); United
States v. Washington, 520 F.2d at 688 refers to the "communal property right" to fish, in
which members hold "stockholder rights."
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tribe's enrollment may result in the loss of statutory benefits, but
can have no impact on vested treaty rights."18
A second, more plausible interpretation of the United States v.
Washington test of tribal existence for treaty rights cases is that
the court was giving expression to a requirement that, as treaty
rights are communally owned property,"8 5 there must be some
86
form of community in existence to be the holder of the rights.'
It may be questioned what the reason is for requiring a finding
that some kind of community exists, if only to satisfy a peculiar
doctrine of Indian law. In answer, it may be said that the requirement is sound, in policy and law, for three reasons. First, a standard is provided to decide whether a given individual may exercise
treaty rights-he may, if associated with the requisite community.
Thus, uncertainty and confusion, which might threaten the states'
efforts to regulate their natural resources, will be avoided.
Second, in a world of rapidly disappearing resources, proper
and responsible management of such resources is imperative. In
the context of treaty hunting, fishing, and water rights, the
''community" requirement is a means of assuring that there will
be a responsible collective authority for management of resources
and regulation of the exercise of treaty rights.' 87 This authority
184. 520 F.2d at 692-93 (emphasis added).
185. Mason v. Sams, 5 F.2d 255, 258 (W.D. Wash. 1925). See also Kimball II and
United States v. Washington, quoted at note 183, supra.
186. This interpretation is made even more credible by the observation that the State
Department of Game, which was the only party to address the issue on appeal, made only
two arguments in its brief: (1) that federal recognition was required before the Upper
Skagit and Stillaguamish tribes could exercise the right to fish; and (2) that because treaty
rights are communal there must exist some "tribal entity to form a basis from which the
treaty rights may emanate." Brief of Appellants, Department of Game and State of
Washington, in No's. 74-2439 and 74-2440, at 69. Clearly, Game was describing the community requirement of communally held rights.
187. There is no question that the tribes have regulatory powers of fishing rights, even
off-reservation. In an old case, New Yorker ex rel. Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556
(1916), the Supreme Court held that Indians were subject to state regulation when fishing
at off-reservation reserved sites.
In Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942), the Court limited the Becker rule to
"restrictions of a purely regulatory nature . . . as are necessary for the conservation of
fish . . ." Id. at 684.
The district courts in United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 336-37 (W.D.
Wash. 1974), and United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp 192, 268-69 (W.D. Mich. 1979)
read Kennedy as a narrow holding limited to its facts. The distinction drawn was that in
Kennedy, involving a cession of land to a private party, the right to fish was termed a
"privilege." In Washington and Michigan the cessions were to the United States, and the
reserved fishing right was considered "a right and not a mere privilege."
Finally, in Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974), the Ninth Circuit held that
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can act to prevent the "tragedy of the commons,"' 8 a situation
which might arise were individual users, exempt from state regulation, allowed access to the resource without recourse to any
authority at all.'8 9
Third, the analysis dovetails nicely with the suggestion in Kimball II that the Klamath Tribe, although in most respects subject
to the sovereignty of the state of Oregon after termination,19 still
retained a narrow form of "sovereign authority . . . to regulate
the exercise of those rights." 9 '
The nature of the "community" required in United States v.
Washington is not certain, but it seems clear that its focal point
need not be broader than the exercise and regulation of treaty
rights. Two inferences support that conclusion. First, United
States v. Washington made clear that tribes exercising treaty
rights do not need to show qualities that would justify application
to them of federal power over Indians. The negative inference is
that all that is required is a showing of an organized, communal
exercise of treaty rights.
Second, Kimball II found a narrow form of sovereignty
relating solely to power over members in regulating exercise of
treaty rights. Further, the Kimball II court noted that Congress,
when it decided not to buy out Klamath treaty hunting and fishing rights foresaw the possibility "that local officials would have
difficulty in later years identifying those who had hunting and
Kennedy considered only "the question of state regulation of off-reservation activities,"
not the question of tribal power. The court held that the tribes "intended to retain not only
their -ancient fishing rights but also the power to regulate the exercise of those rights ....
"
On that basis, the Yakima Tribe's arrest of a Yakima Indian at an off-reservation fishing
site for a fishing violation was upheld.
188. Cf. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
189. Note that interests of conservation have already transcended treaty rights.
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 443 U.S. 165 (1977) (Puyallup 111).
The trend toward quantification of treaty rights will provide individual tribes with incentives to prevent their members from taking a disproportionate share of the tribal allocation.
190. According to the Menominee analysis, the Termination Acts and Pub. L. 280 were
companion measures. Thus, while the courts do not mention the status of the tribes'
general sovereignty, after termination, vis d vis the states, there is a strong implication
that they were intended to lose the lion's share of their sovereignty to the states, except as
saved, as in the case of hunting and fishing rights.
191. 590 F.2d at 776. It might be said that the power to regulate is incident to the property right. Cf.Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974), where the court held that
the power to regulate users was reserved with the right to fish. Again, this is a narrow
power: "Our holding ... is a very narrow one. Off-reservation enforcement is limited
strictly to violations of tribal fishing regulations." 507 F.2d at 240.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss1/2

1980]

TRIBAL EXISTENCE

fishing rights."' 9 2 In Congress' view, then, even considerable
disintegration of tribal society, even to a point where it would be
difficult to discern who had treaty rights, would not affect the existence of treaty property rights. The courts, aware that treaty
rights are communal, limit that broad proposition by adding that
there must be a community to hold the rights. That solves the dilemma of the local officials but should not unduly restrict the
scope of a property right broadly envisaged by Congress. The
logical result, then, is a community composed of descendants of
treaty signatories organized around the exercise of treaty rights to
resources.
Some light is shed on the problem of describing the "community" in United States v. Washington where the test was first
applied, although the factual record is somewhat sparse. The trial
court's findings of fact recited only that the tribes were composed
of descendants of treaty signatories; they had no reservations;
they were not presently recognized by the federal government as
Indian tribal entities; they had documents of organization (not
approved by the BIA); that Congress had appropriated money to
pay Indian claims judgments won by the tribes; and that since the
treaty-making era fishing has been an important means of subsistence and economic support for the tribes.' 9 3
If the interpretation of the test submitted above is correct, the
significant factors were likely (1) descendancy from treaty
signatories, (2) continuous concern with and exercise of treaty
fishing rights, and (3) continuous organization, even without a
common land base and political authority. The organization
could conceivably have been quite informal between the signing
adoption of government documents in the
of the treaty and the
94
century.
twentieth
192. 590 F.2d at 773 n.7.
193. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 378-79, 400-401 (W.D. Wash.

1974).
194. It is interesting to note that the same district court, in a later decision involving

five other tribes, held a substantially similar showing inadequate to support an entitlement to treaty fishing rights. United States v. Washington, 476 F. Supp. 1101 (W.D. Wash.

1979). The district court based its decision that the plaintiffs had no treaty rights on a
finding that they were not tribes, which was in turn based on the facts that (1) the plaintiffs were not presently acknowledged: "Only tribes recognized as Indian political bodies
by the United States may possess and exercise the tribal fishing rights ... ." Id. at 111I;
(2) that treaty fishing rights are "held today for the use and benefit of the persons who
continue to maintain a tribal structure exercising governmental or politicalpowers [emphasis added]"; Id. at 110. The court offered no authority or explanation of its addition of
the last clause onto the test announced by the Ninth Circuit.
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The Stillaguamish and Upper Skagit tribes showed their contin-

uing reliance on the treaty right for cultural and economic purposes. Courts should not necessarily require a related showing of

persistent exercise of treaty rights in the face of non-Indian opposition-as the Supreme Court of Washington has said: "A

multiplicity of arrests for violation of fishing regulations, which
involve the jailing and detention for considerable periods of individuals and consequent hardship to them and their families,
seems to use the unnecessarily hard way of determining whether
they have immunity from certain fishing regulations.""'
Thus, compliance at some point with (illegal) state regulations
should not necessarily be considered a fatal break in the temporal
continuity of the community's exercise of treaty rights. Rather, a
court should temper the standard to account for the "impact of
illegal regulation and of illegal exclusionary tactics by nonIndians."' 9 6

The definition of "tribe" in treaty rights cases, then, is of a

different order than that applicable in cases involving direct exer-

cise of federal powers over Indians. There are doubtless only a
few cases where an Indian group will fail to meet the test of tribal

existence relevant to federal power, and yet meet the test relevant
to the exercise of treaty rights.

theless.

9'

97

There are instances, never-

Nonrecognized tribes should not lose their property

rights by reason of their failure to meet an irrelevant test of tribal

existence.
IV.

Termination of Tribal Existence-Abandonment
and Assimilation

In litigation involving the above tests of tribal existence, a
195. Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 70 Wash. 2d 245, 248, 422 P.2d 754,
756 (1967).
196. It should be borne in mind that the political climate was not always as hospitable
as now for pressing treaty claims. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp.
312, 358 (W.D. Wash. 1974). In this spirit, the United States Supreme Court held, in setting the amount of proportion of fish to which Treaty fisherman are entitled according to
past catches, that "the impact of illegal regulation ... and of illegal exclusionary tactics
by non-Indians ... in large measure accounts for the decline of the Indian fisheries during this century and renders that decline irrelevant to a determination of the fishing rights
the Indians assumed they were securing by initialling the treaties." Washington v.
Washington Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 669 n.14 (1979).
197. In fact, both the Stillaguamish and Upper Skagit tribes are now recognized. 45
Fed. Reg. 27,828 (1980).
198. The five tribal plaintiffs in United States v. Washington, 476 F. Supp. 1101
(W.D. Wash. 1979), are examples.
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question necessarily implied is what meaning or explanation to
give a tribe's failure to make its case. In the easily decided case, a
group will fail to prove that it is now or ever was an Indian
tribe. 99 Difficult cases are posed by groups that prove they did
exist, and that they did have a formal relationship with the
federal government, but which fail to prove that they presently
bear sufficient indicia of "Indian tribes" to justify present
recognition. Some explanation must be found for the change.
Our central concern at this juncture is termination of tribal existence on the part of tribes that are able to demonstrate they did
exist at some relevant time in the past (e.g., at the time of the
passage of the Nonintercourse Act). Abandonment of tribal existence in the context of treaty rights will not be discussed, except
to note in passing that property law of abandonment may be appropriate.
There are, then, two situations that are of interest: (1) the termination of the relationship between the United States and a tribe
by way of congressional action or cessation of tribal existence;
and (2) termination of tribal existence as a defense against
nonrecognized tribes suing under statutes like the Nonintercourse
Act or suing for recognition.
(1)

Common Law History

In the earliest cases, when the foundations of federal Indian
law were being laid, some Justices expressed the view that there
was a point at which a tribe of Indians would become so small in
numbers and so altered from its original state that it would no
longer be proper to include the tribe within the special trust relationship."' °
This "assimilationist" argument never caught on in the
Supreme Court, 20 which instead consistently took the view, an199. Mashpee may be read as such a case.
200. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), McLean, J., concurring. See
also the concurring opinion of Johnson, J., in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87
(1810). "Some [tribes] have totally lost their national fire, and have submitted themselves
to the law of the states. ..."
201. United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876), is sometimes cited for the proposition that the Supreme Court has considered assimilation as a basis for ending the federaltribal relationship. In Joseph, however, there was no tribal-federal relationship between
the Pueblo and the United States, other than as might have been established by the
Nonintercourse Act, and the question was whether to include the Pueblos within the protection of the Act. The Court decided, on the strength of the factual record, that they
should not. The Pueblos were "civilized"and held fee simple title to their land; therefore,
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nounced in a series of dicta, 20 2 that the federal-tribal relationship
could be terminated only by act of Congress or by tribes' "voluntary abandonment of their tribal organization."
(2)

Congressional Termination

In earlier times, Congress directed its efforts at termination of
tribal existence, but found that "the dissolution of tribal existence is easier to decree than to effect. ' 20 3 Cohen described the
efforts to terminate the Wyandotte Tribe, which began in 1850
with a treaty agreement that the tribe would disband.
Apparently the extinguishment clause did not work, for
another treaty containing similar provisions for the extinguishment of tribal existence was entered into by the supposedly
nonexistent tribe some 5 years later. In 1935, Congress again
provided for the final distribution of the funds belonging to the
Wyandotte Tribe. Even this, apparently, did not interfere with
the continued functioning of the tribe, and on July 24, 1937,
the chief of the tribe certified that the members of the tribe, by
unanimous vote, had adopted a tribal constitution under the
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, perpetuating the traditional
20 4
tribal organization.
More recent efforts of Congress have been understood by the
courts as termination of the federal-tribal relationship, or of
recognition, rather than of tribal existence. 2° 1 These efforts have
not had lasting effects. While regulations prevent Interior from
acknowledging terminated tribes,20 " Congress may reverse itself
20 7
and has done so with respect to several tribes.
When Congress does act to terminate its relationship with a
tribe, it must be explicit. Less direct actions, like allotment of
said the Court, they didn't fall within the purposes of the Act.
The opposite result-was reached as to the Pueblos in United States v. Sandoval, 231
U.S. 28 (1913), on a new record.
"By the time Sandoval was handed down in 1913, however, the BIA had compiled
enough information of intoxication, debauchery, and 'moral inferiority' (all described in
great length in the full Sandoval opinion) to prove that Pueblos were Indians, after all."
Getches, Rosenfelt, and Wilkinson, at 179.
202. Beginning with the Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 757, 759 (1867).
203. COHEN. supra note 16, at 273.
204. Id. (footnotes omitted).
205. Kimball 11,590 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1979).
206. 25 C.F.R. § 54.3(e) (1980).
207. Pub. L. 93-197, 87 Stat. 770.
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tribal land, 20 8 extension of citizenship to tribal Indians, 20 9 or splitting of tribes, 2 " do not have the effect of termination.
(3)

"Voluntary Abandonment" and Assimilation

From a doctrinal standpoint, the concept of voluntary abandonment is a neat way of assuring tribes will not lose their protection until either they or Congress choose. As a practical matter,
description of the
however, "voluntary abandonment" is a poor
2
actual processes of social transformation . 11
There is only one case in which a court has found a clear,
knowing, and voluntary abandonment by a tribe of its tribal
status.2 '2 Standing Bear was a chief of the Ponca Tribe, which
had been removed from Nebraska to a reservation in Indian Territory. The tribe-found the climate there was deleterious to its
people, fatal to some. The chief led his people back to Nebraska,
where they took up residence with a friendly tribe. General Crook
seized Standing Bear, with the intent of returning him to the
reservation. On habeas, Standing Bear alleged that his people
"had withdrawn and severed, for all time, their connection with
" The court found for
the tribe to which they belonged .....
that the right
declaration
Standing Bear, based on a congressional
213
society.
free
a
to
fundamental
was
of expatriation
A more common problem than "voluntary abandonment" is
posed in modern times by the social fact of assimilation-intermarriage, loss of tribal custom, adoption of Western life-styles,
"checkerboarding" of reservations. How does assimilation relate
to the problem of definition and proof of tribal existence?
Assimilation, even in advanced degree, is not in itself a legal
basis for changing the status of presently recognized tribes.2 4 In
the case of nonrecognized tribes, some writers think that it is,215
208. United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903).
209. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
210. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
211. See Note, supra note 56, at 164 n.55.
212. United States ax rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 5 Dill. 453, 25 Fed. Cas. No.
14,891 (C. Neb. 1879).
213. In an era when life on-reservation was highly repressive, Cohen used the Standing Bear expatriation argument to make a plea to allow individual Indians to escape
"federal oppression." Indian Rights and Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REV. 145, 185-91

(1940).
214. See Note, supra note 56, at 161-64. See also United States v. John, The Kansas
Indians, Moe, cited supra.
215. St. Clair & Lee, supra note 74, at 108.
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or might be.216 It is difficult to find any reason in law or policy
why any such distinction should be made between an acknowledged tribe and a tribe that, but for lack of acknowledgment,
could be identical (at least with respect to degree of assimilation).
The proponent of the distinction fails to take note of the fact that
the only reason recognized tribes have a particular immunity
from assimilation is that, as noted earlier, recognition (as a legal
status) supplants any factual test of tribal existence. The courts
regard recognition as a prior finding by the political departments
that the group is a tribe. They find sufficient for purposes of
their inquiry and will not question the judgment. This, as was
earlier remarked, is just, because Indians were intended by the
government to take on non-Indian modes of living. The point is
that it is not a valid ground for a rule that nonrecognized tribes
should, after some assimilation, be less reachable by the federal
power over Indians than recognized tribes. Those Indians were
just as subject to non-Indian pressures to assimilate as any
others. Thus, the doctrine of abandonment, rather than mere
assimilation as a basis for finding a cessation of tribal activity,
should apply with as much force to nonrecognized tribes as to
recognized tribes. Where cessation of tribal existence is found not
to be voluntary, the group
should be held still to be within federal
'1 7
power over Indians.
There are two considerations that support the proposition that
abandonment, rather than assimilation, should be the test of
cessation of tribal activity in cases of nonrecognized as well as
recognized tribes. First, it will be recalled that the peculiar history
of recognition includes several examples of tribes that were once
recognized but in one way or another lost that status without congressional mandate. In a perfect world, these tribes would still be
recognized unless they chose not to be. It seems especially signifi216. Note, supra note 56, at 164.
217. This proposal assumes federal power to recognize or reconstitute nonrecognized
Indian tribes. Congress had done this before, in the Indian Reorganization Act, which
permitted individual Indians of one-quarter blood residing on one reservation to organize
as a tribe.
A plausible theory to support exertion of federal power over Indian groups which
have involuntarily ceased tribal activity might go as follows: Absent involuntary cessation
of tribal existence, the group would have been entitled to recognition. As we have seen,
recognized tribes are not affected by changes in tribal relations until Congress takes some
affirmative action to terminate recognition. Because the group ceased tribal relations involuntarily, it could be argued that Congress can treat them as though they were recognized from before the involuntary cessation.
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cant in the case of such tribes that care be taken in ascertaining
the manner in which the asserted cessation of tribal activity took
place. Second, even as to those tribes that were never formally
recognized, they were likely extant at the time of the Nonintercourse Act, which gave certain protections to all tribes. As one
writer has pointed out, there is a certain irony implicit in holding
that assimilation puts tribes beyond federal protection in cases
where1 8assimilation is in large part because of violations of the
2
Act.
The logical and just conclusion is that in the case of all tribes,
nonrecognized and recognized, abandonment should be the
standard by which claims that the tribe has ceased to exist are
measured. Where assimilation is not absolute, it should not be
relevant to the inquiry whether a group is a tribe, any more so
than in cases of recognized tribes.
That was apparently the principle applied in Mashpee, the only
recent decision to deal with the problem.21 9 The district court
sought to fit the fact of assimilation into the voluntary abandonment doctrine, instructing the jury that there was no abandonment if the "tribe went out of existence through some involuntary process of assimilation ...[and] that involuntary imposition
of conditions could not constitute an abandonment. 2 20
The court put the burden of proof of the voluntariness issue on
the tribe because requiring defendant to prove absence of coercion would be requiring it to prove a negative. 22' On the other
hand, involuntariness might be proved by evidence of some coercive act obliging the tribe to assimilate. By focusing on the converse of voluntary choice, coercion, Mashpee brought the standard closer to the realm of the knowable and provable. This is not
to say that the test should be used uncritically, however; the concept "coercion"
can be just as elusive as "voluntary
assimilation. ' 222 But, it is also more susceptible of proof. The
218. Note, supra note 56, at 168.
219. Mashpee v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct.
138 (1979). The district court in United States v. Washington, 476 F. Supp. 1101 (W.D.
Wash. 1979) held simply that having failed to meet the requisite standards, the plaintiffs
were not tribes. It did not attempt to explain what had happened to the tribes that signed
the treaties. The tribes' failure to meet the criteria was in fact due to assimilation,

however,
220. 592 F.2d at 587.
221. Id. at 590.
222. Id. at 588 ("no sure yardsticks by which to measure the court's instructions").
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court of appeals suggested, for example, that "historical records
would reveal forced migrations, governmental dealings, urban encroachments, the presence of outsiders, or other arguably coercive forces .

.

223

There are two points that should be made about the coercion
test of abandonment. The first is that while coercion is doubtless
more provable than voluntary abandonment, it is still abstract
enough to be difficult to prove. Putting the burden of proof of
that issue on the tribes is a judgment that is questionable on
policy grounds, especially concerning a tribe that makes a strong
prima facie case that it was until recently clearly an Indian tribe.
The second objectionable feature of the test is that it requires an
implicit admission from the tribe that it is not presently a tribe
before the tribe can use the explanation that they were coerced into abandonment. This puts tribal litigants to a hard choice between arguing that their present makeup is sufficient to make
them tribes for purposes of federal Indian law, and arguing that
while it is insufficient, it is not their fault.
On the whole, the approach of the Mashpee court was sound.
Even if "voluntary assimilation" is not a realistic view of sociocultural change, as worked out by the Mashpee court, it is an attractive standard. The voluntariness aspect of the standard, even
if unrealistic, is desirable because it reflects the doctrine that "if a
group of Indians has a set of legal rights by virtue of its status as
a tribe, then it ought not to lose those rights absent a voluntary
decision made by the tribe. .. .
V.

Conclusion

As the recent trend toward litigation of Indian rights claims
progresses, courts will necessarily be faced with the issue of tribal
existence in increasing numbers of cases. In order fully to carry
out their part of the federal government's obligations toward Indian tribes, and to protect the valuable property rights reserved
by Indians, the courts must be extremely precise in addressing the
issue.
First, the legal context in which a definition of "Indian tribe"
is required must be identified and the appropriate standard applied. In cases involving the federal power over Indians, the
courts would do well to defer to the Department of Interior, even
223. Id. at 589.
224. Id. at 586.
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where Interior has not yet made any judgment. Interior's new
procedures equip it with the tools necessary to make fair determinations about individual petitioners. Moreover, Interior's
proximity to the policy-making arm of government will enable it
to mix the proper degree of liberality or strictness into its
judgments.
In cases where the courts must make their own findings, they
ought to apply the test of tribal existence found in Interior
regulations, as it is the most comprehensive and flexible yet devised.
In treaty rights cases, the courts should recall that the basic rationale of the definition is different in cases of tribal property. It
would seem appropriate that the test be liberally applied to give
Indians the greatest access to economic necessities reserved by
their forebears.
It is hoped that the foregoing discussion of standards of tribal
existence will aid clear thinking in an area where clear thinking is
crucial.
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